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NAVAL  WASTE 

BY 

DAVID  STARR  JORDAN 


"There  is  no  state  of  readiness  for  war. 
The  notion  calls  for  never-ending  sacrifices. 
Make  up  your  mind  soberly  what  you  want  — 
peace  or  war  —  then  get  ready.  What  we 
prepare  for  is  what  we  get."— W.  G.  SUMNER 


WORLD  PEACE  FOUNDATION 

Boston,  Massachusetts 
February,  1913 


V  A 


NAVAL   WASTE 

DAVID  STARR  JORDAN 

A  petition,  bearing  date  of  January  14,  1913,  has 
been  sent  out  by  the  Navy  League  of  the  United  States, 
asking  for  "legislation  of  the  utmost  importance  re- 
garding the  personnel  of  the  Navy,  and  for  a  council 
of  National  Defense  to  decide  on  a  continuing  and  con- 
sistent program  of  naval  construction."  It  is  further 
stated  that  "to  fix  the  country's  standard,  the  proposed 
Council  of  National  Defense  should  take  into  consider- 
ation the  naval  programs  and  military  strength  of  pos- 
sible opponents." 

To  this,  as  thus  worded,  there  need  be  no  serious 
objection,  especially  if  a  few  modifying  phrases  are 
added.  It  certainly  seems  reasonable  that  a  man  quali- 
fied to  be  an  admiral  should  reach  that  rank  while  still 
in  the  prime  of  life.  Also  there  is  no  evident  reason  why 
a  man  unfitted  to  command  a  fleet  should  ever  become 
admiral. 

It  seems  indeed  desirable  to  have  a  council  of  Na- 
tional Defense,  but  it  should  go  much  farther  than  is 
suggested  by  the  Navy  League.  For  example,  it  should 
show  why,  how,  and  in  what  degree  "national  defense" 
by  force  of  arms  is  necessary  or  justifiable.  It  should 
not  merely  consider  "the  naval  programs  and  military 
strength  of  possible  opponents"  -  —  a  very  simple  matter 
of  statistics,  when  we  agree  who  the  "opponents"  are. 
It  should  enter  into  the  consideration  of  international  re- 
lations, of  the  real  or  assigned  causes  of  military  exten- 
sion in  other  nations,  and  of  the  financial  resources  from 
which  each  nation  must  draw  its  military  exactions.  For 


2  NAVAL  WASTE 

it  is  apparent  that  "the  military  strength"  of  a  nation 
is  not  wholly  nor  even  mainly  gauged  by  the  extent  of 
its  army  or  navy.  In  the  end  all  such  matters  are  de- 
termined by  the  sums  of  money  which  may  be  borrowed 
for  military  purposes  or  which  may  be  exacted  through 
taxation. 

The  principal  function  of  such  a  council  should  there- 
fore be  judicial,  and  its  subject  matter  would  lie  mainly 
in  the  domain  of  international  economics  and  finance. 
Military  and  naval  strategy  would  necessarily  be  a  sec- 
ondary consideration,  and  the  direction  of  thes^  should, 
of  course,  lie  in  the  hands  of  trained  specialists.  But  the 
Council  itself  should  be  composed  primarily  of  states- 
men representing  the  essential  interests  of  the  nation, 
the  most  important  of  which  is  the  maintenance  of  inter- 
national peace. 

Our  council  should  therefore  consider  all  possible 
sources  of  friction  with  other  nations  and  the  means  of 
honorably  removing  them  without  recourse  to  violence 
or  to  the  suggestion  of  violence.  The  strengthening 
bonds  of  internationalism,  the  influence  of  common  in- 
terests, and  the  rapidly  growing  opposition  of  Commerce 
and  of  banking  to  war  and  warlike  demonstrations  should 
be  estimated.  These  considerations  belong  to  the  do- 
main of  statesmanship  and  but  little  to  that  of  militar- 
ism. In  any  case,  a  wide  survey  of  actual  ^condi- 
tions should  be  the  foundation  of  national  policy.  The 
mere  consideration  of  "the  military  and  naval  strength  of 
possible  opponents"  is  but  a  very  small  side  issue  in  the 
general  problem.  No  decision  of  a  "Council  of  National 
Defense"  could  be  acceptable  to  our  people  unless  based 
on  the  broad  consideration  indicated  above. 

Attached  to  this  petition  we  find  "Sixty-seven  Rea- 


NAVAL  WASTE  3 

sons  for  a  Strong  Navy."  To  these  we  turn  with  in- 
terest, and  with  dissappointment.  What  "a  strong  navy" 
is,  is  nowhere  suggested.  Apparently  we  have  never  had 
one.  Or  perhaps  strength  is  only  relative,  consisting  in 
maintaining  the  second  or  third  place  among  nations. 
But  the  vital  question  of  to-day  is,  why  our  navy  need 
keep  its  present  size  and  cost.  Why  need  it  be  made 
larger?  I  do  not  find  in  the  "sixty-seven  reasons"  a 
single  one  which  seems  to  bear  on  either  of  these  points. 

To  the  ordinary  taxpayer,  the  United  States  Navy 
seems  very  large  already.  Its  columns  of  statistics  indi- 
cate an  amazing  growth.  Its  cost,  in  expense,  in  round 
numbers,  was  in  1881,  $13,000,000  per  year;  in  1891, 
$22,000,000;  in  1901,  $56,000,000;  in  1911,  $121,000,- 
ooo ;  in  1912,  $130,000,000.  The  Navy  League  does  not 
state  how  much  more  is  to-day  necessary  for  "a  strong 
navy,"  but  from  other  sources  we  learn  that  $146,000,- 
ooo  would  be,  for  the  time,  an  acceptable  compromise 
figure. 

The  British  fleet,  intended  hitherto  to  double  that  of 
any  possible  opponent,  cost  in  1881,  $51,000,000;  in  1891, 
$69,000,000;  in  1901,  $138,000,000,  and  in  1911,  $203,- 
000,000.  In  Germany,  under  a  very  realistic  threat  of 
destruction  of  her  commerce  and  under  the  spur  of  her 
all-powerful  armament  syndicates  and  military  aristoc- 
racy, the  navy  expenses  stood  at  $11,000,000  in  1881 ; 
$23,000,000  in  1891 ;  $38,000,000  in  1901 ;  and  $115,000,- 
ooo  in  1911.  Thus  the  navy  of  the  United  States  is 
now  second  in  cost,  whether  in  effectiveness  or  not,  to 
the  navy  of  Great  Britain  alone.  With  no  superfluous 
marine  stations  to  care  for,  the  German  navy  may  have 
greater  actual  power.  In  any  event,  that  of  the  United 
States  is  one  of  the  most  costly  institutions  ever  pro- 


4  NAVAL  WASTE 

jected.  Its  yearly  expenses  exceed  the  endowment  reven- 
ues of  all  the  Universities  of  the  world, — the  foundations 
of  intellectual  advancement.  They  exceed  the  cost  of 
maintenance  of  all  industrial  and  technical  schools  of  all 
grades,  including  all  colleges  of  Engineering  and  Agri- 
culture, —  the  foundation  of  the  world's  industrial  ad- 
vancement. 

Now  if  a  "strong  navy"  demands  all  this  and  more 
than  this,  there  must  be  strong  reasons  in  its  favor,  both 
absolute  and  relative.  To  give  reasons  for  having  "a 
navy"  does  not  suffice.  We  must  all  admit  that  a  sea- 
faring nation  requires  a  navy.  It  must  do  its  part  in  in- 
ternational police,  in  removing  the  dangers  of  the  sea, 
in  rendering  assistance  to  citizens  in  trouble  abroad,  in 
so  far  as  this  can  be  done  without  invading  the  actual 
sovereignty  of  other  nations. 

Some  thirty  of  the  "sixty-seven  reasons"  would  be 
met  by  the  moderate  and  efficient  navy  of  1881,  just  as 
well  as  by  the  ten  times  more  costly  one  of  1912.  The 
fact  that  Great  Britain  spends  still  more  than  we  do 
and  that  Germany  has  about  overtaken  us,  is  likewise 
not  an  argument  in  itself.  It  is  for  us  to  show  some 
very  valid  reasons  why  we  should  strive  to  keep  in  the 
race  with  these  militant  nations  whose  problems  and 
purposes  are  very  different  from  ours.  Moreover,  to 
argue  that  a  navy  is  useful  does  not  prove  that  one 
twice  as  costly  would  be  twice  as  useful. 

"The  Navy  is  our  main  defense."  This  is  true  in  a 
military  sense  only,  but  waiving  that  point  for  a  moment, 
we  ask  for  the  completion  of  the  sentence:  defense 
against  whom?  Of  the  hundreds  who  use  this  phrase, 
no  one  has  furnished  a  valid  answer.  The  United  States 
has  not  an  enemy  in  the  world.  There  is  apparently 


NAVAL  WASTE  5 

not  a  rival  nation  which  could  fight  us  if  it  would,  or 
would  fight  us  if  it  could.  We  are  surrounded  by  peace, 
which  cannot  be  broken  except  by  ourselves.  Apparently 
there  is  not  a  nation  which  by  naval  attack  could  harm 
us,  even  without  a  "strong  navy,"  to  a  degree  in  any 
way  comparable  to  the  injury  to  itself,  through  the  loss 
of  our  friendship,  the  loss  of  our  trade. 

It  is  said  that  once  a  Spanish  commandant  at  the 
Presidio  of  San  Francisco,  wishing  properly  to  salute  a 
British  ship,  sent  on  board  the  vessel  to  borrow  the  nec- 
essary powder.  In  like  fashion  it  would  appear  that 
the  large  nations  in  Europe  or  Asia,  overloaded  with 
debt  and  therefore  short  of  funds,  must  first  borrow 
money  in  New  York  before  any  of  them  could  make  war 
on  the  United  States. 

It  is  not  clear  that  we  should  concern  ourselves 
with  what  other  nations  are  doing  in  this  neck  to  neck 
Marathon  race,  which  is  entailing  such  risks  on  Europe, 
unless  we  are  brought  also  into  jeopardy.  That  the 
naval  competition  of  Europe  injures  us  is  plain,  not 
that  it  involves  a  war-menace  to  us,  but  that  it  threatens 
the  destruction  of  credit,  and  that  it  has  filled  the 
world  atmosphere  with  war  talk  and  war  scares,  —  mat- 
ters opposed  to  the  well-being  of  all  peoples. 

Because  every  dollar  spent  in  armament  strengthens 
the  financial  interest  in  war,  because  it  gives  more  vol- 
ume to  war  scares  and  war  talk,  we  believe  that  the  war 
armaments  of  the  world,  so  far  from  being  a  national 
defense,  constitute  in  each  of  the  armored  countries 
the  chief  actual  danger.  We  cannot  say  that  increased 
armament  makes  for  peace,  when  plainly,  the  world 
over,  it  makes  for  war.  It  makes  for  peace  only  as  it 
brings  about  tax-exhaustion,  and  as  the  money-lenders 


6  NAVAL  WASTE 

of  the  world  are  no  longer  willing  to  consent  to  the  dan- 
gers of  conflict  between  any  two  of  the  great  nations. 

The  strained  relations  in  Europe  between  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente  (due  primarily  no  doubt 
to  jealousy  of  rival  exploiters)  are  being  enormously  ac- 
centuated by  the  tremendous  array  of  armament  the 
nations  concerned  have  accumulated  under  the  guise  of 
"national  defense."  Every  additional  ship  adds  to  the 
danger  of  war.  The  great  conciliating  forces  of  inter- 
nationalism— the  real  defense  of  civilized  nations — have 
been  strained  as  they  have  rarely  been  before.  For  all 
this,  militarism  and  armament  building  have  been  mainly 
responsible.  War  is  the  business  of  armies  and  navies, 
and  their  aggregate  influence  the  world  over  is  for  war. 

Great  Britain  has  made  the  historic  claim  to  the 
"Overlordship  of  the  Sea,"  with  the  power,  if  need  be,  to 
destroy  the  commerce  of  rivals,  as  she  once  destroyed 
that  of  Holland  and  deranged  that  of  France.  Germany 
has  expressed  her  resolve  not  "to  lie  down  before  this 
perpetual  menace."  This  rivalry  has  become  in  itself 
and  in  time  of  peace  "a  great  European  calamity."  Pei- 
haps  but  one  greater  is  conceivable  —  that  of  open  war. 

The  unthinkable  cost  of  such  a  war  has  made  it  vir- 
tually impossible ;  no  thanks,  however,  to  army  or  navy. 
A  better  feeling  appears  lately  in  the  councils  of  Europe. 
Apparently  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Balkan 
troubles  have  shown  somewhat  of  the  depths  of  the  abyss 
towards  which  militarism  and  exploitation  were  driving. 

The  true  defense  of  any  nation  worth  defending  must 
lie  in  the  intelligence,  alertness  and  resources  of  its 
people.  Along  with  this  go  the  increasing  power  of  in- 
ternationalism, the  ties  of  common  thought  and  aspira- 
tion, and  most  immediately  the  innumerable  bonds  wov- 


NAVAL  WASTE  7 

en  by  trade  and  by  the  common  interests  of  business, 
small  as  well  as  great. 

We  should  look  upon  our  Navy  as  a  contribution  to 
the  good  order  of  the  world.  It  is  a  natural  part  of  a 
future  International  Police  which  shall  guarantee  the 
safety  of  life  and  property  at  sea  the  world  over.  It 
should  be  as  ready  to  protect  shipping  against  icebergs 
and  derelicts  as  to  ward  off  an  enemy  from  the  coast. 

One  of  the  first  steps  in  this  direction  is  to  take 
away  from  the  Navy  its  present  right  of  piracy  in  time 
of  war.  For  while  private  property  on  land  is  now  im- 
mune, the  merchant  ships  under  an  adversary's  flag  may 
still  become  a  prize  or  perquisite  of  a  man-of-war.  There 
is  no  justification  for  this  anomaly.  The  relief  to  com- 
merce by  the  abrogation  of  the  "Prize"  system  would 
take  away  much  of  the  sting  of  international  rivalries, 
and  the  commercial  public  would  welcome  the  powerful 
help  of  the  Navy  League  in  achieving  this.  If  we  could 
also  add  the  abatement  of  such  protective  tariffs  as  are  in- 
tentionally obstructive,  and  of  the  use  of  force  of  arms 
to  promote  private  spoliation  in  weak  countries,  there 
would  not  be  much  left  for  nations  to  wrangle  over. 
But  however  desirable  ultimately  the  absolute  disarma- 
ment of  nations  as  against  each  other,  we  cannot  hope  to 
reach  it  in  a  day  nor  in  a  generation.  These  matters 
proceed  by  slow  progress,  interrupted  by  reaction ;  we  are 
in  a  period  of  relapse  at  present,  when  reactionary  forces 
seem  to  be  in  the  ascendant.  But  this  very  fact  with  its 
burdens  and  horrors  may  be  counted  on  to  turn  the  bal- 
ance in  the  other  direction. 

Neither  will  there  be  a  formal  federation  of  nations 
in  this  era.  Indeed  federation  in  fact  will  come  long 
before  it  comes  in  name.  A  single  unified  world-govern- 


8  NAVAL  WASTE 

ment  with  centralized  rule  under  one  set  of  men  at  some 
one  place,  is  only  a  dream  —  and  not  a  cheerful  dream 
at  that.  What  the  world  needs  is  more  self-control,  not 
more  governmental  machinery. 

Nevertheless  every  step  in  removing  injustice,  in 
eliminating  sources  of  friction,  in  extending  common 
interests,  as  the  postal  union,  the  telegraph  union,  in- 
ternational law,  international  police  duties,  international 
conferences  and  congresses,  arbitration  treaties  and 
other  agreements  —  are  steps  in  the  direction  of  the 
passing  of  war.  To  this  end,  three  great  contributing 
agencies  are :  the  growth  of  the  popular  conscience,  the 
interlocking  of  personal  interests,  and  the  ruinous  ex- 
pense which  the  progress  of  science  has  brought  to  every 
branch  of  military  art.  And  by  the  same  token  each  one 
of  the  six  reasons* of  the  naval  circular  headed  as  "na- 
tional defense"  is  more  or  less  fallacious.  As  already 
noted  it  is  not  true  that  "the  Navy  is  our  main  defense," 
that  the  Navy  has  "21,000  miles  of  coast  to  defend,"  that 
"undefended  resources  invite  aggression."  All  this  im- 
plies a  mediaeval  relation  among  nations.  And  as  to  the 
second  of  these,  do  we  infer  that  the  need  of  defense  is 
proportional  to  the  length  of  the  coast  line?  If  so,  our 
coast  line  is  nearly  forty  times  as  long  as  that  of  Germany. 

The  United  States  isolated  by  its  geography,  by  its 
democracy,  by  its  freedom  from  entangling  alliances,  by 
its  blood-kinship  with  all  the  European  nations,  by  a 
commanding  relation  to  European  commerce,  is  appar- 
ently beyond  all  need  of  such  protection.  There  is,  in 
fact,  something  primitive,  outworn  and  unprogressive  in 
the  spectacle  of  a  civilized  nation  composed  of  millions 
of  clever  people  trusting  for  its  defense  to  forts  and 
ships.  With  all  the  resources  of  business,  of  science,  of 


NAVAL  WASTE  9 

education,  of  thought,  to  depend  on  force  seems  a  lazy, 
even  cowardly,  shrinking  of  the  higher  possibilities  of 
national  strength.  To  be  surrounded  by  armed  guards 
"holding  the  drop"  on  all  commercial  rivals  is  not  a  lofty 
conception  of  a  nation's  greatness.  This  attitude  has 
been  as  disastrous  to  England's  own  peace  of  mind 
as  it  has  been  menacing  to  the  world's  welfare.  For  the 
American  republic  to  follow  needlessly  an  .example  like 
this  would  seem  an  ignominious  surrender  of  democ- 
racy to  mediaevalism. 

The  eleven  "reasons"  drawn  from  history  are  either 
fallacious  or  irrelevant.  In  no  way  do  they  relate  to 
the  "strong  navy"  which  the  Navy  League  advocates. 
In  history,  no  nation  ever  had  such  a  navy.  It  is 
to-day  making  its  own  precedents. 

The  navy  did  not  "win  the  war  of  1812."  It  was 
not  "won"  at  all,  by  anybody. 

As  to  the  war  with  Spain,  the  less  said  the  better.  But 
surely  we  cannot  say  that  "the  Spanish  war  would  never 
have  taken  place  had  Spain  known  our  Navy's  strength." 
The  United  States  took  the  initiative  in  that  war,  and  for 
motives  of  politics  and  business  not  connected  with  the 
military  situation.  This  occurred  after  Spain,  through 
our  minister  at  Madrid,  had  agreed  to  grant  every  de- 
mand of  the  United  States,  including  autonomy  to  Cuba 
and  arbitration  of  all  differences,  including  the  loss  of  the 
Maine.  In  passing  it  may  be  remarked  that  much  of  the 
disorder  in  Cuba  at  that  time  was  stimulated  in  New 
York. 

The  peace  of  Great  Britain  and  that  of  Germany  has 
not  been  assured  by  navies,  and  only  in  part  and  for  a 
time  by  armies.  At  the  time  Germany  was  overrun  by 
the  French  she  was  split  up  into  a  number  of  petty  war- 


10  NAVAL  WASTE 

ring  states.  In  peaceful  reunion  and  cooperation  they 
have  found  strength.  True,  to  a  certain  point  the  army  of 
Germany  for  a  while  served  as  a  protection  from  neigh- 
bors seeking  revenge  from  humiliations  arranged  by  Bis- 
marck. But  beyond  this  point,  the  overgrowth  of  army 
and  navy  has  given  an  impuse  toward  war.  This  the 
firm  hand  of  the  Kaiser,  with  the  caution  of  his  bankers, 
has  thus  far  held  in  check.  The  strength  of  Germany 
does  not  lie  in  her  military  domination,  which  is  on  the 
whole  a  burden,  but  in  her  system  of  education  and  in 
the  industry  of  her  people. 

The  weakness  of  China  hitherto  has  lain  in  the  ab- 
sence of  justice,  of  education,  of  science,  of  interest  in 
public  affairs  on  the  part  of  her  people.  China  could  have 
no  greater  misfortune  than  to  develop,  in  her  present 
condition,  a  great  army  and  navy  with  the  accompanying 
war  atmosphere. 

The  failure  of  Turkey  lies  mainly  in  the  fact  that  she 
has  little  else  than  "war  atmosphere."  Her  hold  in  Eu- 
rope as  in  Asia  is  that  of  military  despotism,  and  her  fi- 
nancial excesses,  mostly  for  army  and  navy,  have  plunged 
her  hopelessly  into  debt. 

Concerning  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  cited  as  a  source  of 
danger,  if  it  be  such,  it  should  be  reexamined  and  inter- 
nationalized. Above  all,  it  would  seem  that  it  might  be 
merged  into  a  joint  Pan-American  doctrine  in  which 
Brazil,  Argentina,  Chile,  Canada  and,  it  may  be,  Mexico 
and  the  lesser  states  should  have  part.  It  might  well 
blend  with  the  Drago  Doctrine,  most  salutary,  that  na- 
tional force  of  arms  should  not  be  used  as  an  agency  to 
uphold  private  interests  in  foreign  lands.  To  invade  a 
district  because  of  a  dispute  over  a  more  or  less  crooked 
franchise,  does  not  promote  international  justice. 


NAVAL  WASTE  11 

The  United  States  has  no  vexatious  "attitude  towards 
possession  or  ownership  of  strategic  alien  harbors  and 
coaling  stations."  The  attempt  to  make  an  issue  out  of 
imaginary  conditions  at  Magdalena  Bay  put  the  United 
States  Senate  in  an  absurd  position.  The  resolution 
passed  by  the  Senate  was  not  signed  by  the  President 
and  it  is  therefore  null  and  void. 

"Battleships  are  cheaper  than  battles."  They  are  like- 
wise inciters  of  battles.  Say  also :  "revolvers  are  cheaper 
than  tombstones." 

The  cost  of  the  Navy  is  not  a  "cheap  insurance."  Be- 
yond a  certain  point  it  does  not  insure,  and  there  is  no 
evidence  that  the  bulk  of  the  property  it  insures  could 
ever  be  in  any  danger  whatever,  even  in  time  of  war. 

As  to  the  cost  of  automobile  tires,  the  amount  is  not 
relevant ;  for  the  owners  of  automobiles  pay  for  the  tires, 
not  the  nation  at  large.  Those  who  cannot  afford  them 
soon  cease  to  use  them. 

The  cost  of  insect  waste  through  the  destruction  of 
birds,  is,  as  Admiral  Wainwright  has  shown,  more  than 
the  cost  of  the  Navy.  Yet  when  the  nation  asks  for 
money  to  check  such  destruction,  or  for  any  similar  pur- 
pose of  conservation,  sanitation  or  economy,  the  approp- 
riations are  most  grudging  —  the  Army  and  Navy  must 
first  take  their  share. 

We  are  told  recently:  "If  the  Republican  party  had 
allowed  the  Navy  to  run  down  there  would  be  European 
battleships  headed  for  the  Mexican  ports  at  this  time." 
Does  anybody  believe  this  ?  Does  any  one  believe  that  the 
chief  influence  of  the  United  States  in  international  af- 
fairs is  created  by  her  warships?  If  this  were  true,  it 
would  certainly  be  most  humiliating. 

That  "a  reduced  navy  would  impair  national  credit," 


12  NAVAL  WASTE 

or  that  "a  navy  insures  against  unsettled  conditions  of 
trade  and  commerce,"  are  assertions  merely.  If  they 
were  true,  they  would  be  subject  to  limitations  of  reason. 
The  credit  of  the  United  States  is  already  higher  than 
that  of  any  of  the  Great  Powers.  The  financiers  of  the 
world  can  read  figures  of  debt  and  waste,  and  are  not 
fooled  by  appearances. 

Outside  the  sphere  of  war,  the  actual  duties  of  the 
American  Navy  should  mostly  lie.  In  this  field  we  freely 
admit  it  has  had  an  honorable  record;  not  the  least  of 
this  has  been  the  service  of  the  good  old  steamer  Alba- 
tross, which  under  the  auspices  of  the  Navy  has  con- 
tributed more  than  any  other  single  agency  to  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  deep  sea  and  its  inhabitants.  At  the  same 
time  we  must  admit  that  most  of  these  duties  of  special 
service  have  been  thrown  on  the  smaller  and  cheaper 
ships,  such  as  those  of  the  present  Revenue  Cutter  Ser- 
vice and  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey.  It  is  not  easy 
to  imagine  a  dreadnaught  serving  any  useful  purpose  in 
time  of  peace. 

"The  weight  of  a  powerful  navy  gives  force  to  di- 
plomacy" -  —  on  the  well  known  principle  of  the  "brass- 
knuckle."  "National  efficiency"  as  shown  by  a  great 
navy  is  no  evidence  that  our  side  in  a  quarrel  is  just. 

It  may  be  true  that  treaties  and  agreements  in  the  past 
have  sometimes  failed,  especially  where  overridden  by 
the  military  caste,  and  by  the  interests  of  exploitation. 
It  may  be  that  war  is  sometimes  inevitable,  though  not 
often  when  effort  is  put  forth  to  make  it  a  last  resort 
and  not  a  first.  No  nation  has  yet  refused  to  accept  a 
decree  of  arbitration.  The  interests  of  justice  demand 
that  no  contestant  be  at  the  same  time  judge  of  his  own 
cause.  Arbitration  treaties  serve  to  clinch  and  hold  pub- 


NAVAL  WASTE  13 

lie  opinion,  —  and  in  the  long  run  public  opinion  rules. 
War  is  only  a  man-made  convention  —  a  coarse,  brutal 
and  blundering  way  of  settling  disputes.  It  has  changed 
its  form  and  character  all  down  through  the  ages,  from 
the  tribal  raids  to  the  "Strangling  of  Persia."  It  is  now 
passing  because  the  tax-payers  can  no  longer  afford  it ; 
and  in  its  last  struggles  it  shows  itself  as  hard,  selfish 
and  venomous  as  it  did  in  the  days  of  Alva  and  Wal- 
lenstein. 

"Negative  righteousness  means  abstaining  from  evil, 
but  positive  righteousness  may  require  a  fight  against 
evil."  There  is  no  evil  greater  than  war,  and  the  one 
honorable  fight  of  our  times  is  the  struggle  to  relegate 
this  to  the  place  of  last  resort.  As  it  recedes,  the  great 
navies  of  the  world  must  recede  with  it. 

The  way  to  peace  lies  through  peace.  "Power  and 
Strength"  conjured  up  by  debts  never  to  be  paid  and 
maintained  by  intolerable  taxation  the  world  over,  have 
no  essential  part  in  "the  noble  task  of  peace-maker." 

There  are  two  groups  of  motives  behind  the 
movement  for  naval  extension,  the  one  barely  hinted  at 
in  the  Naval  circular,  the  other  not  at  all ;  but  both  more 
potent  than  any  of  the  "sixty-seven."  The  circular  re- 
fers to  the  fact  that  naval  extension  gives  work  to  thous- 
ands of  men.  It  also  gives  large  revenues  on  many  mil- 
lions of  capital.  In  Europe,  there  are  few  exploiting 
firms  more  powerful  than  the  great  "Syndicates  for  war." 
In  England,  according  to  Mr.  G.  H.  Ferris,  one  man  in 
every  six  is  in  some  way  financially  interested  in  the 
business  of  war  or  war  preparation.  For  the  United 
States,  we  have  no  statistics ;  and  our  armour-plate  in- 
dustries are  less  in  the  public  eye  than  those  of  the 
Krupps,  Schneiders,  and  Armstrongs  of  Europe. 


14  NAVAL  WASTE 

It  is,  however,  an  axiom  in  economics  that  public 
money  paid  for  labor  is  money  wasted  unless  the  pro- 
duct be  useful  to  the  public  service.  That  warships  cost 
money  and  money  is  paid  to  capitalist  and  to  laborer,  is 
no  argument  for  building  them.  Under  normal  condi- 
tions the  same  money  and  labor  might  run  in  useful 
channels.  It  might  be  used  to  restore  our  merchant  ma- 
rine, driven  out  of  existence  by  our  "protection"  to  ship- 
builders. If  warships  are  of  public  service,  to  build 
them  is  a  productive  industry.  If  they  are  not  necessary, 
what  is  paid  for  them  is  lost  as  much  as  though  it  were 
directly  sunk  in  the  sea. 

A  second  motive  not  indicated  in  the  Naval  Circular, 
is  that  of  giant  decoration.  We  may  say  that  the  rich- 
est nation  in  the  world  is  entitled  to  the  costliest  and 
most  showy  accessories.  The  world-wide  parade  of  our 
fleet  seems  to  have  had  some  such  motive  behind  it.  It 
has  shown  itself  openly  in  the  desire  expressed  by  high 
authority  to  build  the  greatest  navy  in  the  world  —  just 
for  greatness  sake.  It  appears  in  the  decision  of  Con- 
gress to  make  the  latest  battleships  —  the  Pennsylvania, 
for  example  —  bigger  than  any  other  ships  of  the  kind  in 
the  world.  One  might  argue  in  this  fashion;  "We  are 
young  and  strong  and  progressive ;  we  will  beat  old  Eu- 
rope at  her  own  game,  and  that  whether  or  not  the  game 
be  worth  the  candle." 

There  is  no  touch  of  greed  in  this  view  of  naval 
greatness,  and  in  so  far  we  may  view  it  with  respect, 
even  though  we  may,  with  an  eminent  British  states- 
'man,  regard  it  as  "sheer  vulgarity."  But  it  cuts 
across  our  democratic  traditions  of  economy  and  sim- 
plicity. It  ill  befits  a  practical  people  whose  chief  am- 
bition is  expressed  in  "Success." 


NAVAL  WASTE  15 

To  sum  up: — Behind  nominal  reasons,  we  find  the 
world  over  three  motives  or  groups  of  motives  for  naval 
expansion.  The  desire  "to  safeguard  peace"  is  not  one 
of  these  —  words  only,  when  used  in  this  connection. 
Actual  motives  are  (i)  caution  or  fear,  (2)  business  de- 
mands, and  (3)  love  of  display.  The  first  of  these  has 
been  much  exaggerated  in  the  interest  of  the  second. 
The  second  and  third,  both  unavowed,  are  very  real  and 
very  human,  and  both  must  be  reckoned  with  in  all  pub- 
lic affairs. 

There  is  also  an  element  which  favors  extravagant 
appropriations  as  a  means  of  obstructing  tariff  reduction. 
The  United  States  stands  almost  alone  among  nations  in 
having  no  responsible  authority  behind  expenditures.  It 
has  as  yet  no  formal  budget,  and  its  finances  are  at  the 
mercy  of  shifting  and  log-rolling  majorities.  Our  re- 
public is  perhaps  the  only  great  corporation  which  can 
spend  money  without  consideration  of  its  actual  income. 

The  Navy  of  the  United  States  stands  near  the  part- 
ing of  the  ways.  Shall  it  continue  the  honored  servant 
of  a  democratic  people,  or  shall  it  develop  into  a  special 
caste,  unchecked  as  to  expense,  uninterested  in  any  mat- 
ters save  pomp  and  war? 

Militarism,  says  John  A.  Hobson,  survives  in  the 
world  because  it  "is  serviceable  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
plutocracy.  Its  expenditure  furnishes  a  profitable  sup- 
port to  certain  strong  vested  interests.  It  is  a  decorative 
element  in  social  life,  and  above  all,  it  is  necessary  to  keep 
down  the  pressure  of  the  forces  of  internal  reform." 

Thus  far  our  naval  personnel,  as  a  whole,  has  been 
typical  of  our  democratic  citizenship.  It  has  never  ap- 
peared as  a  warrior  caste  claiming  special  privilege  and 
authority,  as  has  often  been  the  case  in  Europe.  In  its 


16  NAVAL  WASTE 

feelings  and  purposes  it  has  not  stood  apart  from  the  body 
of  the  people. 

In  a  recent  article  on  the  "Psychology  of  War,"  Dr. 
Hugo  Miinsterberg  declares  that  "inner  wavering"  as 
to  righteousness  of  "relentless  fight"  should  be  "absolutely 
excluded  from  the  officer's  mind.  He  will  not  deny  the 
harm  and  the  losses  war  brings  with  it.  But  at  the  same 
time  he  will  be  deeply  impressed  by  the  tremendous  moral 
power  of  a  national  self-defense  which  concentrates  the 
energies  of  the  whole  nation  in  loyalty  to  its  historical 
mission.  He  must  grasp  the  fundamental  role  of  war 
in  the  history  of  mankind  as  the  great  vehicle  of  progress, 
as  the  great  eradicator  of  egotism,  as  the  great  educator 
to  a  spirit  of  sacrifice  and  duty."  This  represents  an 
ideal  alien  to  the  spirit  of  democracy  —  and  we  trust 
that  it  may  always  be  alien.  And  when,  we  may  ask  in 
passing,  was  war  "an  eradicator  of  egotism"  in  a  con- 
quering nation  ? 

"Defense"  at  present  certainly  absorbs  far  too  much 
of  our  national  attention  as  well  as  of  our  national  rev- 
enues. One  cause  of  this  lies  in  the  initial  mistake  of 
making  the  control  of  the  army  and  navy  each  co-ordinate 
departments  of. the  national  government.  In  normal  re- 
lations of  civilization  "national  defense"  might  consti- 
tute a  bureau  of  the  department  of  State,  as  national 
sanitation  might  constitute  a  division  of  the  department 
of  the  Interior.  Surely  Education,  Sanitation,  Conserva- 
tion, Reclamation,  Administrative  Economy  are  quite 
equal  in  importance  to  the  need  of  physical  defense 
against  external  foes. 

Our  great  republic,  above  all  other  nations,  should 
be  rich  in  diplomatic  resources,  in  proportion  to  its  es- 
cape from  the  historical  evils  which  led  our  ancestors  to 


NAVAL  WASTE  17 

leave  the  Europe  of  their  day  to  form  a  nation  of  free 
men  unhampered  by  caste,  tradition  or  privilege. 

Necessary  expenditures  in  any  line,  we  need  not  call 
into  question.  But  it  is  well  that  the  people  should  con- 
sider carefully  what  real  necessities  are.  Whatever  goes 
beyond  this  is  waste.  All  waste  calls  for  more  waste  — 
and  waste  everywhere  breeds  corruption.  What,  then, 
are  our  motives  for  steady  and  enormous  increase  in  naval 
expenditure?  The  "sixty-seven  reasons"  furnish  no  sat- 
isfactory explanations,  no  valid  arguments.  The  fear  ex- 
pressed by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  that  France  or 
even  Japan  may  get  ahead  of  us,  has  no  pertinence  what- 
ever. To  know  the  purposes  of  France  or  the  resources 
of  Japan,  information  perfectly  accessible,  fully  answers 
the  implied  argument. 

We  should  not  go  on  building  great  floating  fort- 
resses simply  because  we  have  so  begun,  nor  because  Eng- 
land builds  or  Germany  builds,  or  France  builds  or  Aus- 
tria, nor  because  we  may  fall  to  third  place  or  tenth  place 
in  the  rush  if  we  do  not  build.  There  is  no  apparent 
rational  motive  in  such  action ;  and  if  valid  causes  lie  be- 
hind it,  it  is  fair  that  these  should  be  made  known. 

Moreover,  wars  do  not  come  by  accident,  nor  with- 
out warning,  nor  are  they  dispensations  of  an  uncon- 
trollable Providence.  A  war  is  a  form  of  world  sickness. 
It  affects  for  ill  every  function  of  civilization.  It  is 
brought  on  by  human  blundering,  and  it  is  quite  as  amen- 
able to  sanitation  as  any  other  form  of  human  disorder. 


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